Risks and Technical Debts

Risks

Risks are ordered by priority (highest first). Priority is derived from probability × impact. The probability and impact values are inferred in Phase 2 and must be confirmed by a security review — see ADR review and OPEN_QUESTIONS.adoc (Q3.8.1).

ID Risk Prob. Impact Priority Mitigation

ID	Risk	Prob.	Impact	Priority	Mitigation
R-007	No STRIDE threat model backs the security mechanisms, so threat completeness is unverified (no code evidence — deferred).	High	Medium	High	Author a STRIDE threat model (deferred — Architect, Operations). The candidate threats T-001..T-007 in [section-concepts] are the starting point.
R-001	The LLM emits a destructive shell command and `bash` executes it (threat T-001).	Medium	High	High	Tiered tool permissions + command allow/deny lists ([section-concepts] Security); `bash` timeout scenario in [section-quality-scenarios].
R-004	An untrusted project’s `.vibe/` config (tools, hooks, agents) executes on first entry (threat T-005).	Medium	High	High	Trust-folder gate ([section-concepts] Security).
R-002	A secret file is read, or `webfetch` is used for SSRF (threats T-002, T-004).	Medium	Medium	Medium	Sensitive-pattern gating and `ASK` permission on `webfetch` ([section-concepts] Security).
R-003	A file write or patch lands outside the working directory (threat T-003).	Low	High	Medium	Working-directory boundary ([section-concepts] Security).
R-005	The Mistral API key leaks from disk (threat T-006).	Low	High	Medium	Keyring storage and RSA+AES payload encryption ([section-concepts] Security).
R-006	A malicious hook command runs as a shell subprocess (threat T-007).	Low	High	Medium	Experimental-hooks gate ([section-concepts] Security) — hooks run only when `enable_experimental_hooks` is set; bounded 30 s timeout and 3 retries ([section-quality-scenarios]).
R-008	A large pinned dependency surface (~80 direct dependencies) carries supply-chain exposure; no SBOM or scanning config is in the bounded context [pyproject.toml:30-141].	Medium	Medium	Medium	uv.lock pins every transitive dependency; `exclude-newer` constrains new releases. Adding an SBOM / scan is unmitigated — deferred.
R-009	Behaviour on a sustained LLM-provider outage (beyond retry exhaustion) is not specified in code (deferred).	Medium	Low	Low	Retry/backoff scenario in [section-quality-scenarios]; the intended end-state is deferred to Operations.
R-010	No performance budget exists in code for very large repositories (deferred).	Low	Low	Low	Byte-capped file reads and auto-compaction bound growth; an explicit budget is deferred.

R-007

No STRIDE threat model backs the security mechanisms, so threat completeness is unverified (no code evidence — deferred).

High

Medium

High

Author a STRIDE threat model (deferred — Architect, Operations). The candidate threats T-001..T-007 in [section-concepts] are the starting point.

R-001

The LLM emits a destructive shell command and bash executes it (threat T-001).

Medium

High

High

Tiered tool permissions + command allow/deny lists ([section-concepts] Security); bash timeout scenario in [section-quality-scenarios].

R-004

An untrusted project’s .vibe/ config (tools, hooks, agents) executes on first entry (threat T-005).

Medium

High

High

Trust-folder gate ([section-concepts] Security).

R-002

A secret file is read, or webfetch is used for SSRF (threats T-002, T-004).

Medium

Medium

Sensitive-pattern gating and ASK permission on webfetch ([section-concepts] Security).

R-003

A file write or patch lands outside the working directory (threat T-003).

Low

High

Medium

Working-directory boundary ([section-concepts] Security).

R-005

The Mistral API key leaks from disk (threat T-006).

Low

High

Medium

Keyring storage and RSA+AES payload encryption ([section-concepts] Security).

R-006

A malicious hook command runs as a shell subprocess (threat T-007).

Low

High

Medium

Experimental-hooks gate ([section-concepts] Security) — hooks run only when enable_experimental_hooks is set; bounded 30 s timeout and 3 retries ([section-quality-scenarios]).

R-008

A large pinned dependency surface (~80 direct dependencies) carries supply-chain exposure; no SBOM or scanning config is in the bounded context [pyproject.toml:30-141].

Medium

Medium

uv.lock pins every transitive dependency; exclude-newer constrains new releases. Adding an SBOM / scan is unmitigated — deferred.

R-009

Behaviour on a sustained LLM-provider outage (beyond retry exhaustion) is not specified in code (deferred).

Medium

Low

Low

Retry/backoff scenario in [section-quality-scenarios]; the intended end-state is deferred to Operations.

R-010

No performance budget exists in code for very large repositories (deferred).

Low

Low

Byte-capped file reads and auto-compaction bound growth; an explicit budget is deferred.

Technical Debt

Each item names the Chapter 5 building block it burdens.

ID Burdened Building Block Debt Evidence

ID	Burdened Building Block	Debt	Evidence
TD-001	Agent Loop	`session_cost` is a self-described rough estimate that ignores prompt caching, so the `--max-price` ceiling is approximate.	vibe/core/types.py:102-115
TD-002	ACP Bridge	`acp/tools/` re-implements several builtins (`bash`, `read_file`, `write_file`, `search_replace`, `grep`, …) that already exist in `core/tools/`, duplicating maintenance.	vibe/acp/acp_agent_loop.py:650-666
TD-003	Session Persistence	A v1→v2 session-format migration is carried in code; it can be removed once all users have migrated.	vibe/core/session/session_migration.py:16-41
TD-004	CLI / Textual UI	The TUI widget layer is large (~70 widget modules) and untiered, which makes the front end the least diffable part of a recovery run.	vibe/cli/textual_ui/widgets/
TD-005	CLI / Textual UI	Voice mode is shipped but marked experimental and "may change".	README.md:284-285

TD-001

Agent Loop

session_cost is a self-described rough estimate that ignores prompt caching, so the --max-price ceiling is approximate.

vibe/core/types.py:102-115

TD-002

ACP Bridge

acp/tools/ re-implements several builtins (bash, read_file, write_file, search_replace, grep, …) that already exist in core/tools/, duplicating maintenance.

vibe/acp/acp_agent_loop.py:650-666

TD-003

Session Persistence

A v1→v2 session-format migration is carried in code; it can be removed once all users have migrated.

vibe/core/session/session_migration.py:16-41

TD-004

CLI / Textual UI

The TUI widget layer is large (~70 widget modules) and untiered, which makes the front end the least diffable part of a recovery run.

vibe/cli/textual_ui/widgets/

TD-005

CLI / Textual UI

Voice mode is shipped but marked experimental and "may change".

README.md:284-285

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