Cross-cutting Concepts

Threat Model (STRIDE)

Warning

No STRIDE threat model exists in the code base. The threats below are candidate threats, derived in Phase 2 from the code-visible risk surfaces (see [section-technical-risks]). The completeness of this catalogue and the validation of each threat are deferred to the Architect and Operations — see ADR review and OPEN_QUESTIONS.adoc.
T-ID STRIDE Candidate Threat Risk

T-001

Tampering, Elevation

The LLM emits a destructive shell command and bash runs it [vibe/core/tools/builtins/bash.py:480-530].

R-001

T-002

Information Disclosure

A file tool reads a secret file such as .env [vibe/core/tools/builtins/read_file.py:60-66].

R-002

T-003

Tampering

A file write or patch lands outside the working directory [vibe/core/tools/utils.py:64-125].

R-003

T-004

Information Disclosure

webfetch is pointed at an internal/loopback URL (SSRF) [vibe/core/tools/builtins/webfetch.py:62-119].

R-002

T-005

Elevation of Privilege

An untrusted project’s .vibe/ config (tools, hooks, agents) executes on first entry [vibe/core/trusted_folders.py:19-32].

R-004

T-006

Spoofing, Information Disclosure

The Mistral API key leaks from disk [vibe/setup/auth/api_key_persistence.py:14-16].

R-005

T-007

Tampering

A malicious hook command runs as a shell subprocess [vibe/core/hooks/executor.py:11-55].

R-006

Security

Every mitigation references the T-IDs it closes.

Mechanism Description Closes

Tiered tool permissions

Each tool resolves to ALWAYS / ASK / NEVER; ASK prompts the user before executing [vibe/core/tools/base.py:83-113].

T-001, T-004

Command allow/deny lists + arity

bash matches command prefixes against allow/deny lists; sudo always asks [vibe/core/tools/builtins/bash.py:228-243, vibe/core/tools/arity.py:145-158].

T-001

Sensitive-pattern gating

File and search tools treat */.env as sensitive and force an approval prompt [vibe/core/tools/builtins/read_file.py:60-63].

T-002

Working-directory boundary

File tools require paths inside the working directory (or an --add-dir root); otherwise an extra approval is required [vibe/core/tools/utils.py:64-125].

T-003

Trust-folder gate

A folder containing .vibe//AGENTS.md triggers a trust prompt; untrusted folders do not load project config [vibe/core/trusted_folders.py:75-122].

T-005

Secret storage

API keys are stored in ~/.vibe/.env or the OS keyring; encrypted payloads use RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM; browser sign-in uses PKCE [vibe/core/auth/crypto.py:13-137, vibe/setup/auth/browser_sign_in.py:173-184].

T-006

Read-only agent profiles

The plan and chat profiles are read-only, enforced by ReadOnlyAgentMiddleware [vibe/core/middleware.py:174-216] — see ADR-003.

T-001, T-003

Experimental-hooks gate

Hooks are disabled unless enable_experimental_hooks is set, so a project’s hook commands do not run as shell subprocesses by default [vibe/core/config/_settings.py:534, vibe/core/hooks/config.py:78].

T-007

Test

The test concept is a pytest suite (pytest + pytest-asyncio
respx + pytest-textual-snapshot) with test doubles named Fake* in tests/stubs/ [AGENTS.md:84-92]. CI runs the suite plus strict pyright and ruff [.github/workflows/ci.yml].

Warning

Tests are not traced to use cases or business rules, and the pyramid shape (unit / integration / end-to-end proportions) is not declared. Establishing per-use-case traceability — each test naming the ../use-cases-vibe.adoc use case it covers — is deferred to the Developer.

Observability

  • Tracing. OpenTelemetry spans wrap the agent invocation and each tool execution, with the conversation id propagated as OTEL baggage; the OTLP exporter is enabled only when telemetry and OTEL config are present [vibe/core/tracing.py:23-137].

  • Logging. Structured stdlib logging writes to ~/.vibe/logs/vibe.log; level and rotation size are env-configurable [AGENTS.md:68-69].

  • Usage telemetry. Usage events go to the Mistral datalake, gated by enable_telemetry and the presence of an API key [vibe/core/telemetry/send.py:58-95].

  • ACP message log. When VIBE_ACP_LOGGING_ENABLED is set, every ACP protocol message is recorded [vibe/acp/acp_logger.py:17-59].

Error Handling

Configuration

Configuration is layered and merge-aware: project .vibe/config.toml directories are walked breadth-first (up to four levels) and then the user ~/.vibe/config.toml layer is applied; layers merge field-by-field with declared strategies (replace, concat, union, shallow, conflict) [vibe/core/config/builder.py:24-122, vibe/core/paths/_local_config_walk.py:132-168]. VIBE_HOME relocates the entire user state directory [vibe/core/paths/_vibe_home.py:19-25]. This concept is listed because the system genuinely has a configuration concern that crosses every building block.